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Maybe it is the time of the year that Ramstein Air Base looks even greyer and
gloomier than usual in the cold November twilight, maybe it is the bitter thought of
the decision the German Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht
– short: BVerwG) has delivered on 25th November 2020 in the case of Jaber vs.
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) denying any individual claim to further
action by the German government to ensure compatibility with international law of
US drone strikes operated via Ramstein (so far the full reasoning has not yet been
published, but just a short press release). In light of the progressive decision of the
OVG NRW below (which I commented on here) the decision of the BVerwG comes
rather unexpected; and then again it is not really a surprise.
But let’s take one step back and recall what Jaber vs. the FRG was all about and
investigate why the decision of the BVerwG may put international lawyers in such a
gloomy mood.
The case of Jaber vs. the FRG
The plaintiffs in the case at hand, three Yemeni men, lost two relatives in a drone
strike on their village in 2012. The drone strike was carried out by US forces as a
“signature strike”, an attack where the US targets an unidentified person based on
a pattern of suspicious behaviour as identified through metadata. Both relatives
of the plaintiffs were not involved in terroristic activities and were presumably not
the target of the drone strike but accidental victims. After unsuccessfully pursuing
an action in the US, the plaintiffs turned to the FRG. They argued that because
of the essential importance of Ramstein Air Base (located in Germany) for US
drone strikes, it was the FRG’s responsibility to prevent US air strikes via Ramstein
that violate international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRL). The
first instance administrative court of Cologne dismissed the case in 2015. This
judgment was overturned by the OVG NRW in 2019, which found that Germany had
to adopt “suitable measures” to ensure that US drone strikes operated via Ramstein
complied with international law, but was under no obligation to prevent drone
strikes via Ramstein entirely. This obligation arose under the FRG’s responsibility to
protect under Article 2 (2) (1) of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz – short: GG)
guaranteeing the right to life. The OVG NRW affirmed the extraterritorial application
of Article 2 (2) (1) GG if there was a “sufficient link” with the German territory which
it saw in the use of Ramstein for the relay of data necessary for the drone strikes
in Yemen. It held that assuring the compatibility of actions originating from German
territory with international law was a legal question subject to judicial scrutiny – not a
purely political matter triggering unlimited governmental discretion. Subsequently the
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court found that there were strong indications for several possible violations of IHL
and HRL through US drone strikes in Yemen, requiring further action of the German
Government to ensure adherence of US actions to international law.
The judgment of the BVerwG of 25th November 2020
On appeal of the defendants, the BVerwG restored the first-instance judgment. It
regarded the action as inadmissible concerning one of the three plaintiffs who does
not live in Yemen and thus lacked standing. With regard to the other two plaintiffs,
the BVerwG affirmed the admissibility, however held that the action was unfounded.
It claimed that even though it was correct that Article 2 (2) (1) GG could in general
trigger an extraterritorial responsibility of the FRG to protect the right of life, the
requirements were not met in the case at hand. The BVerwG applied a much stricter
test than the OVG NRW (1) regarding the establishment of violations of international
law and (2) concerning the condition of a “sufficient link” with the state territory.
First, the BVerwG found that the mere possibility of a violation of international law
by another state (in the sense of the “precautionary principle” on which the OVG
NRW based its decision) was not sufficient to trigger the responsibility to protect
under Article 2 (2) (1) GG of the FRG. Rather, it stated that this duty only arose
when, based on the number of violations of international law that have already
occurred, and the surrounding circumstances, it could be concretely expected that
acts contrary to international law would continue to occur in the future impairing
or endangering fundamental rights. With regard to determining what constitutes
such a violation of international law by another state, the court held that because
of the structural peculiarities of international law, the assessment of the actions of
other states under international law may depend on the range of plausible legal
arguments. In the case at hand the BVerwG did not consider the assessment of the
OVG NRW regarding possible violations of IHL and HRL as sufficient to meet these
requirements.
Second, the BVerwG requires a “qualified reference” to German territory. According
to the BVerwG such a reference is undoubtedly lacking if the alleged conduct
consists in a purely technical transmission process without any decision-making
element. In the view of the BVerwG the OVG NRW did not conclusively determine
that the involvement of Ramstein in armed drone operations in Yemen also included
the evaluation of information or decision-making elements taking place in Germany.
However, the BVerwG did not remand the case to the OVG NRW for further
inquiries, as it concluded that even if such violations of international law triggering
the responsibility of the FRG were to be affirmed, and even if a “qualified reference”
to the German state territory could be established, the FRG by repeatedly consulting
with the US government and obtaining an assurance from the US that activities in
US military properties in Germany are conducted in accordance with applicable
law, was acting within its margin of discretion because the measures could not be
qualified as totally inadequate. Thus, the BVerwG granted the German government a
wide margin of discretion when fulfilling their obligations under Article 2 (2) (1) GG.
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This decision leaves the international lawyer gazing sadly out of the window into the
cold November rain for multiple reasons; out of which three aspects are particularly
hurtful steps back in the judicial enforcement of international law in comparison to
the judgment of the OVG NRW:
The “structural peculiarities of international law”
In its considerations regarding the assessment of a breach of international law
through the conduct of a foreign state triggering the FRG’s responsibility to protect
under Article 2 (2) (1) GG, the BVerwG underlines that because of the structural
peculiarities of international law, the assessment of the actions of other states
under international law may depend on the range of plausible legal arguments.
This gives the German Government a great margin of appreciation concerning the
existence and exact content of rules of international law which a court should only
second-guess if the Government’s position is arbitrary. Even though, this view is
in consonance with the established case-law of the German Federal Constitutional
Court (BVerfG; see e.g. the Heß Case), the BVerfG itself in its late Varvarin
Decisionseemed to depart from this doctrine, demanding lower courts to apply
and interpret international law, if legal scrutiny on the basis of objective criteria
was possible.  The OVG NRW’s comprehensive engagement with the relevant
provisions of international law in the previous instance gave rise to the hope that
courts were willing to take up the challenge and slowly depart from the doctrine
which has been striping international law partly of its legal character, rendering its
interpretation arbitrary to a great extent. For the moment this hope has been dashed
by the BVerwG’s decision.
The superelevated threshold of a “concrete danger” for recurring violations of
international law and the “qualified reference” to the German territory
Moreover, while the OVG NRW deemed a “violation of international law” and a
“sufficient link” with German territory as sufficient to trigger the responsibility of
the FRG, the BVerwG demands a “concrete danger” for recurring violations of
international law and a “qualified reference” to German territory, raising the threshold
for the extraterritorial application of the protective duty under Article 2 (2) (1)
GG considerably. It is highly unlikely that these requirements will ever be met in
practice, which can be seen in the case at hand, where the OVG NRW went through
considerable efforts of establishing violations of IHL and HL through drone strikes in
Yemen, still being dismissed by the BVerwG as insufficient. Regarding the “qualified
reference” to the German territory it is possible to envision situation where this
criterion might be fulfilled, e.g. imagining an American pilot on German soil operating
a drone in Yemen. However, the assessment  by the BVerwG disregards the fact
that such a link may be established by the FRG’s permission given to the US to
operate a relay station for drone strikes at Ramstein Air Base. But that permission
was subject to the condition that US activities on German territory respect German
law, especially the GG and German obligations under international law.
A broad margin of discretion in matters of foreign affairs
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Lastly, the BVerwG granted the government a broad margin of discretion concerning
the fulfilment of the extraterritorial protective duty, holding that as long as its
measures could not be qualified as totally inadequate, they were in line with Article
2 (2) (1) GG. This is where the decision does not come as a surprise: the reception
of the OVG NRW’s decision has shown that putting judicial limits to government
conduct in foreign affairs – with complicated diplomatic, and sensitive state security
implications, which lie at the heart of state sovereignty –   is a difficult balancing act.
In practice, the decision of the OVG NRW might have had unbearable consequences
for the US-German relations which would have forced the German government
to disregard the court’s decision, posing an imminent threat to the integrity of
the German judicial system and the rule of law. With the decision in question the
BVerwG might have spared us this constitutional crisis.
However, in doing so it appears that the BVerwG has lowered again the role national
courts may take up in interpreting and enforcing international law. The plaintiffs now
have the possibility to lodge a constitutional complaint to the BVerfG and in the last
resort turn to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Hopes thus lie with the
BVerfG – which seems in a mood to apply fundamental rights extraterritorially (see
the BND judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court; with a comment on
Völkerrechtsblog here) – and with the ECtHR, which has a longstanding tradition of
extraterritorial application of human rights. Maybe – after Christmas, in the New Year
– the judicial enforcement of international law will experience a second spring.
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